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Introduction
This chapter focuses on vigilantism in Greece. Specifically, it examines the Golden
Dawn, a group that beyond engaging in vigilante activities is also the third biggest
political party in the country. The Golden Dawn is distinct from a number of other
European parties broadly labelled under the ‘far right’ umbrella in that it was formed as
a violent grass-roots movement by far-right activists, its main activities prior to 2012
confined to the streets. It can be described as a vigilante group, which frequently uses
violence, engages in street politics, has a strong focus on community-based activities,
and whose members perceive themselves as ‘street soldiers’. Since 2013 a number of its
leading cadres, who are also members of the Greek parliament, have been undergoing
trial for maintaining a criminal organization and other criminal acts including murder
and grievous bodily harm.
The progressive entrenchment of this group in the Greek political system has
raised a number of questions about its potential implications on the nature of
democracy and policy-making. This chapter examines various dimensions of the
Golden Dawn’s vigilante activities. Following a brief overview of the Greek socio-
political context, it proceeds to examine the party’s ideology, its organizational
structure, its various operations, communications activities and relationships with
other political actors and groups in Greece.
The political, social and economic environment
Political violence and the history of vigilantism in Greece
Vigilante and paramilitary activities have a long tradition in Modern Greek
history. According to Psychogios (2013), political violence, including terrorism,
clashes between protesters and the police, and neo-Nazi racist attacks, is not
infrequent in Greece because it is ingrained in Greek political culture. The civil
war (1946–1949) and military junta (1967–1975) are pertinent examples of
political violence. Vigilantism during these periods was primarily aimed, not
against ethnic minorities or migrants, but against political opponents. For
example, the military regime often targeted political dissidents, and in turn left-
wing activist groups and/ or individuals perpetuated violent acts directed against
the regime (Voglis 2011). The legacy of both events has been the maintenance
of this culture of violence that characterizes Greek society, as political consensus
among political parties remained at a minimum level after the restoration of
democracy (Papasarantopoulos, 2014).
Vigilantism during the metapolitefsi era
The period between the restoration of democracy in 1974 and the eruption of
the economic crisis in 2008 was characterized by relative political stability.
Nonetheless, the adversarial nature of Greek politics maintained the deeply
engrained culture of confrontation. During this period, the Greek political system
was characterized by a competition between two main parties, the centre-left
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and the centre-right New Democracy
(ND), which together occupied the majority of the 300 seats in the Greek Par-
liament (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2013). Most small parties were exclu-
ded from parliamentary representation and vigilante activities took place mainly
on the streets.
During this era, political violence was perpetrated by vigilante groups of both
the right and the left, some targeting political opponents and others targeting
minorities. Most notably, right-wing extremist groups during the early metapo-
lifsi era (1970s and 1980s) targeted mostly the so-called ‘internal enemies’ (Psarras
2012), i.e. left-wing activists. Michaloliakos, the leader of the Golden Dawn, was
a protagonist in those attacks. Notable examples include an attack against five
journalists during the funeral of a well-known military junta supporter police
officer; a series of bomb explosions in various areas of Athens, most importantly
in two cinemas that showed Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) movies
on the 4th anniversary of the restoration of Democracy. Michaloliakos was
arrested in both instances (Psarras 2012). During the 1990s, and after the creation
of the Golden Dawn, attacks against internal enemies as well as against migrants,
increased. Psarras (2012) identifies at least 27 violent attacks against left-wing
individuals, workers and immigrants by members of the Golden Dawn. Also,
after the collapse of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, there was an influx of
immigrants from those countries, mostly Albanians, who suffered from a large
number of racial attacks (Lazaridis and Skleparis, 2015). An example is the mass
attacks against Albanians after an international football game between Greece and
Albania (Karamanidou, 2016).
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Vigilantism post-2008: the Golden Dawn and the Greek crisis
The eruption of the economic crisis in 2008 altered the dynamics of party competi-
tion, as it resulted in a grand coalition between PASOK, ND and the far right
Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS). During this period, the Greek government signed
the first Memorandum of Understanding with the European Union (EU) and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), which offered Greece financial aid and set
economic policy conditionality between the country and its creditors (Vasilopoulou
et al., 2014). This Memorandum became the target of a number of small, anti-
establishment Greek parties, which blamed it for the accentuation of the economic
crisis because of the austerity measures that accompanied it. As a result, in 2012
representation increased for small parties. A total of seven parties entered parliament,
including the Golden Dawn. This trend continued in the 2014 European Parliament
elections and the subsequent January and September 2015 national elections,
indicating the party has consolidated a secure voting base of circa 6–7%.
Therefore, Greece’s severe economic crisis was in many ways pivotal for the
changing dynamics in Greek politics. What is key about the Greek case, however,
is the extent to which the economic crisis became translated into a problem of
governance and a broader crisis of legitimacy and democratic representation (Hali-
kiopoulou and Vasilopoulou 2018), indicated by lack of trust in political institu-
tions and an overall dissatisfaction with democracy. Notably, trust in political
parties, trust in government and parliament, and satisfaction with democracy
declined dramatically in the period between 2007 and 2013, dropping well below
the EU average (European Commission, 2018) (for details, see Appendix A1).
At the same time, trust in institutions that employ violence, such as the army and
the police, remain high in Greece. Notably, trust in the army and trust in the
police both increased during the period 2010–2014. This is a broader illustration of
support for authoritarianism, which partly explains the authoritarian attitudes
expressed in the support for Golden Dawn. The political crisis in Greece was not
just a rejection of the established political parties, but rather a rejection of the
political system as a whole (Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou 2018), which created
fertile ground not only for smaller parties in general, but specifically vigilante
groups defined by authoritarian attitudes and an endorsement of violence.
Immigration and the treatment of minorities in Greece
The deeply engrained culture of violence (Psarras 2012) as well as support for
authoritarian values and nationalism (Fragkoudaki 2013) are often manifested in a
deep-seated intolerance against a number of minority groups, including homo-
sexuals, people with left-leaning attitudes, members of other religions and different
ethnic groups. The treatment of minorities in Greece has often been criticized by
international human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty International (Human Rights Watch, 2013). This discrimination intensi-
fied post-2012, partly legitimated by the fact that violent, vigilante groups such as
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the Golden Dawn enjoyed parliamentary representation. This can be illustrated by
both non-institutionalized activities that have taken place on the streets, such as the
events that unfolded outside the Hytirio theatre in Athens in 2012, when a Greek
theatre company was verbally and physically abused by members of the public,
Golden Dawn MPs and members of the Greek Orthodox Church for attempting
to stage a version of Terence McNally’s Corpus Christi; and in the institutionalized
form of discriminatory policies, for example ‘Hospitable Zeus’, a policy introduced in
2012 as part of an initiative to reduce the number of illegal immigrants. The racism
and overt discrimination characterising the policy have led to severe criticisms with
regards to the extent to which human rights are respected in Greece (Vasilopoulou
and Halikiopoulou, 2015). These examples suggest that attitudes towards minorities
may be understood as part of a broader xenophobia that pervades Greek political
culture (Lazaridis and Skleparis, 2015).
It is important to note that this scepticism and intolerance towards minorities is to
a degree separate from actual levels of immigration in Greece. While this issue has
been increasing in salience across Europe, and constitutes one of the key factors to
which the rise of the far right is attributed in a series of comparative studies (see e.g.
Ivarsflaten 2008; Inglehart and Norris 2016), in Greece, immigration figures are
generally low compared to other European countries, and actually declined during
the period of economic crisis (see Appendix A1). In addition, research on party
manifestos before and after the eruption of the crisis has shown that immigration is
not one of the three most salient issues in the Golden Dawn’s agenda (Halikiopoulou
et al., 2016). Indeed, immigration is ranked as the 4th or 5th most important issue
facing the country from 2005 onwards (European Commission, 2018).
With regards to the refugee crisis, Greece is one of the most greatly affected
countries in Europe. Between April 2015 and September 2015 Greece received
approximately 400,000 new asylum seekers (Dinas et al. 2017). Exposure to the
refugee crisis was much greater in certain islands of the eastern Aegean, given their
proximity to the Turkish coast, such as Lesvos, which during the same period
received over 200,000 asylum seekers (ibid.: 2). Research illustrates that in those
Greek islands that faced a massive inflow of refugees just before the September
2015 election, vote shares for Golden Dawn did indeed increase, but only mod-
erately, by 2 percentage points (Dinas et al., 2017). Beyond voting patterns,
refugee camps in islands such as Lesvos have frequently become the target of
extreme right-wing violence (see e.g. ekathimerini.com, 2018).
The ideology and organizational structure of the Golden Dawn:
justification and motivation
Given the centrality of violence in both its ideology and practices, the Golden
Dawn can be described as a vigilante group. The party endorses ‘the collective use
of extra-legal violence’ (Moncada, 2017) and fulfils most of Johnston’s (1996) cri-
teria for vigilantism, including the planning of the act of violence, the voluntary
participation by private citizens, the exercise of autonomous citizenship and the use
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and frequent threat of violence. More specifically, in accordance to Moncada’s
(2017) classification, the Golden Dawn acts as a vigilante group in terms of its social
organization, identified targets, its repertoire, justification and motivation. In terms
of social organization, the planning and execution of vigilante activities take place
at the group level, involving leading cadres of the party and members. In terms of
targets, in accordance with its Nazi ideology (see below), the Golden Dawn iden-
tifies two sets of enemies, internal and external. The former are usually members of
left-wing groups and organizations; the latter are immigrants or refugees. In terms
of its repertoire, the party adopts both lethal and non-lethal tactics, which include
a range of physical and psychological forms of violence. The justification lies in
nationalism (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015); and their motivation, more
narrowly, can be found in the party’s palingenetic (Griffin, 1991) vision: i.e. the
need to cleanse the Greek nation of its internal and external enemies, so to
facilitate its rebirth.
Its leader, Nikolaos Michaloliakos, founded the Golden Dawn in 1980 as a bul-
letin (Bistis, 2013), which openly supported Nazism (Hasapopoulos, 2013). Although
the party has increasingly denied the ‘Nazi’ label, promoting itself instead as a Greek
Nationalist Party (Ellinas, 2013; Psarras, 2012; Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou,
2015), its ideology fulfils all the criteria for what constitutes a fascist, and specifically
Nazi, group (Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou, 2015). In line with Mann’s (2004)
definition of fascism, the Golden Dawn is pan-nationalist, authoritarian, statist, and
militarist. It seeks to transcend social cleavages and cleanse the nation of internal (i.e.
political dissidents) and external (i.e. those not belonging to the ‘organic’ nation)
enemies (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015). The two key ideological themes
in its programmatic agenda include a focus on societal degeneration and a proposed
final solution, which encompasses the necessity for national rebirth through a col-
lective movement from below. In other words, while the party itself may reject the
Nazi label, it nonetheless espouses all core Nazi principles.
Nationalism is a central principle in the Golden Dawn’s ideology and the basis of
justification of its violent and vigilante activities. In its manifesto the party makes
clear that to be a member of Golden Dawn one must accept the principle of
establishing the state in accordance with nationalism, which it defines in ethnic-
organic terms as the supremacy of the ‘ethnos-race’ (Vasilopoulou and Halikio-
poulou, 2015: 55). In this regard the party places great emphasis on biological and
ascriptive determinants of national belonging, including blood, genealogy, race and
common ancestry. The party’s nationalism is linked to its palingenetic vision
(Griffin, 1991; Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015), i.e. the need for the Greek
nation to be reborn from the ashes of the old degenerate order for which corrupt
domestic and external elites are responsible. It presents itself as the saviour and
defender of the Greek nation, which is unique and superior to all other nations
(Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015: 71). The party is racist and indis-
criminately anti-immigrant, portraying all others as ‘barbarians’ who must be
cleansed so that the nation can be reborn.
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The party’s organizational structure reflects its ideology. It can best be described
as a top-down political organization (Ellinas and Lamprianou, 2017a), highly con-
centrated, strictly hierarchical and militaristic (The Economist, 2013). As noted
above, the Golden Dawn openly endorses and employs violence. Militarism is key
to the Golden Dawn in both ideological and organizational terms. The party sees
the army as the ultimate value, both because it is the protector of national security
and because it embodies the ultimate value of collective sacrifice for the nation
(Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015: 61). Members are seen as ‘street soldiers’
fighting for the nationalist cause. They are known for the organization of local
paramilitary groupings, which train and carry our raids against a variety of target
groups, including immigrants, Roma groups and left-wing groups (Hasapopoulos,
2013; Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015).
Golden Dawn’s organization expanded after the party’s entry in the Greek par-
liament in 2012. From just 4 local organizations in Athens, Thessaloniki, Piraeus
and Kalamata in previous years, the party had developed a total of 69 local bran-
ches and 9 local cells across the Greek territory in 2015 (Ellinas and Lamprianou,
2017a). Their activities also increased, with 3594 recorded during the 2012–2015
period (Ellinas and Lamprianou, 2017a).
Many Golden Dawn members and leading cadres of the party, including the leader
Nikolaos Michaloliakos, are well known for their activities in the right-wing extremist
community and have criminal records (Psarras, 2012). Many were previously members
of the extreme right party August 4th, which was dissolved in 1977, and also of the
National Political Union that openly supported the extreme right junta regime.
Michaloliakos has been linked to a series of bombings in bookstores that sell books
related to Soviet Union and cinemas showing ‘left-leaning’ movies (Hasapopoulos,
2013: 13); he was arrested for possession of weapons and bombs in 1976, when he
spent ten months in prison (Psarras, 2012). The more recent examples of the criminal
activities and records of Golden Dawn officials are discussed in the ‘Operations and
activities’ section of this chapter.
Support and membership
Electoral support: According to the vast literature on far-right voting behaviour,
certain socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics are shared by far right
voters. Far-right supporters tend to be economically and culturally insecure voters
with authoritarian attitudes, often disillusioned with the system and untrusting of
democratic institutions (e.g. Norris, 2005). Far-right supporters are most commonly
male, either unemployed or in precarious employment. They tend to be working
class and/ or low-income individuals who compete with immigrants for jobs and
social status (Lucassen and Lubbers, 2012) and they have low levels of education.
They are the losers of modernization (Kriesi et al., 2006), those most vulnerable to
social change who have come to resent the political establishment that left them
behind. An examination of the Golden Dawn voter profile shows some con-
sistency with the findings of this broad literature, but also some differences, notably
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in terms of the socio-demographic dimension. Using data from the Hellenic Panel
Component of the 2014 European Election Study (EES), Vasilopoulou and Hali-
kiopoulou (2015) find that attitudinal variables are more significant in determining
the propensity for the Golden Dawn than socio-demographic variables. The
Golden Dawn voter is unlikely to have a university degree, is highly disaffected by
the political system, has little trust in the government and most likely belongs to the
right of the political spectrum (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015:47–48).
Lamprianou and Ellinas (2017) confirm that economic grievances have a limited, and
cultural grievances a moderate, effect on GD voting, while the strongest correlates of
GD voting are those capturing institutional grievances.
In terms of socio-demographic variables, we know from the June 2012 exit poll
(Georgiadou, 2013) that the voters of the party are mainly male (76%) and 44 years
old or younger. The September 2015 exit poll shows a similar picture (www.
metronanalysis.gr). Interestingly, Golden Dawn supporters vary across different
occupations (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015). The only occupations that
the Golden Dawn is underrepresented amongst are pensioners and housewives,
which is also captured from the gender and age group categories. The fact that
Golden Dawn’s supporters come from a broad range of occupational sectors is in
contrast with the main findings from the existing literature on extreme-right voting
and supports the political grievance model.
Membership: Data with regards to the membership of the organization is less readily
available. As the Golden Dawn is an official political party with fairly broad electoral
support, it would be incorrect to assume that all its voters automatically take part in
vigilante activities. This requires a closer look at the party’s membership. To a great
extent, the composition of Golden Dawn’s membership confirms the ‘angry white
men’ paradigm (Bistis, 2013; Psarras, 2012). The majority of members are males
under the age of 50. Female membership, however, has been increasing, with a
substantial number of women having joined the party (REF). In terms of gender
representation, women tend to have their own Golden Dawn forums where they
come together to discuss issues and organize a variety of activities (e.g. White
Women Front: www.whitewomenfront.blogspot.uk)
Operations and activities
The Golden Dawn operates on three different levels: as a political party, as a pro-
test and pressure group and as a vigilante group. While it adopts violence at all
levels, only in the latter can its activities be explicitly described as vigilante. We
may also distinguish between those activities the party undertakes indoors to
communicate with activists and those it organizes outdoors to communicate with
voters (Ellinas and Lamprianou, 2017b). In terms of its activities as a political party,
the Golden Dawn runs in national, European and local elections. Despite its par-
ticipation in democratic procedures, the party is generally critical of democracy and
disrespectful of democratic institutions. The party’s dismissal of liberal democracy is
reflected by the behaviour of Golden Dawn MPs in parliament and their disrespect
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of other elected officials. Examples abound. Following their election, the party
leader and leading cadres performed a Nazi salute upon their entry in Parliament.
During the same year and in a public display of violence, Ilias Kasidiaris threw a
glass of water on SYRIZA MP Rena Dourou and slapped KKE MP Liana Kaneli
live on Greek television (Telegraph.co.uk, 2012).In 2016, Golden Dawn MEP
Lampros Fountoulis violently interrupted an event organized to discuss the situa-
tion with ethnic Turks living in Thrace (Crisp, 2016). In 2017, Golden Dawn party
spokesman Ilias Kasidiaris attacked ND MP Nikos Dendias on the pretext that the
latter walked in front of him while Kasidiaris was talking (Ekathimerini.com, 2017).
And, in June 2018 Golden Dawn MP Konstantinos Barbarousis called for a military
coup d’état during his talk in Parliament on the Macedonia question (Kathimerini.
gr, 2018). The MP was subsequently charged with treason and arrested.
In terms of protest and pressure group activities, the Golden Dawn is highly
active, especially following its electoral success in 2012. For example, Ellinas
and Lamprianou (2017a) show that, within the time span of three years, the
party organized a total of 3594 activities, including speeches and ‘debates’
where Golden Dawn members discuss current affairs, historical and ideological
issues and electoral campaigns; political activities, such as celebrations, demon-
strations and even camps and exercises for their members; and social charity
activities, such as the organization of job centres, food and clothes collections,
blood donations (Ellinas and Lamprianou, 2017a). It is important to note here
that these latter activities were intended only for Greeks, a status to be con-
firmed by the presentation of a Greek identity card to one of the Golden
Dawn members on site, and are part of a broader Golden Dawn initiative to
offer an alternative service of state and welfare provisions reminiscent of the
Nazi ‘Winterhilfswerk’ (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015).
In terms of its vigilante activities, Golden Dawn members have been consistently
involved in violent acts since the group’s establishment. The group was notorious
for a range of violent acts in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. Group members often
wear black uniforms and military trousers, reflecting the group’s military-style
organization, in an attempt to instil fear. As noted above, their targets are those
groups they identify as internal and external enemies; in other words, left-wing
activists and immigrants. An exhaustive list of recorded cases would take up the
space of this entire chapter. An indicative list of well-known cases includes the
murder of left-wing student Dimitris Kousouris in 1998; numerous attacks against
immigrants and pro-immigrant organizations; threats and vandalism at the Chytirio
theatre in Athens in 2012 to ‘protest’ against the staging of the play ‘Corpus
Christi’; the murder of the 26-year-old Pakistani immigrant Shehzad Luqman, who
was stabbed by members of Golden Dawn in Athens in 2013 (To Vima, 2015);
and the murder of left-wing activist Pavlos Fyssas in 2013, which triggered the
arrest of 20 or so Golden Dawn MPs.
Golden Dawn operations continue. They patrol neighbourhoods in order to
provide security to Greeks and carry out attacks. They even carry out visits to
workplaces to encourage employers to hire Greeks instead of foreign workers
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(Margaronis, 2012). Since the emergence of the refugee crisis, Golden Dawn
members introduced another vigilante activity, which is common in other coun-
tries, namely boat patrols, to push back the refugees who try to enter Greece from
the Aegean Sea (Xchange.org). Despite the notoriety of their violent activities and
pending indictment, the Golden Dawn continues to run for election as its leading
cadres continue to serve as elected representatives.
Communication activities: Golden Dawn propaganda offline
and online
The Golden Dawn has a very elaborate propaganda strategy. The party is particu-
larly active in disseminating its message, both verbally and visually, through online
and offline means of communication. The message they try to convey is the fol-
lowing: the Golden Dawn is a Greek nationalist party, not a Nazi party. While, for
example, the party’s logo (see Figure 11.1 below) is reminiscent of the Nazi
Swastika (Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou, 2015), the Golden Dawn itself insists it
is the Meander – an ancient Greek symbol – and completely unrelated to Nazism.
As noted above however, despite the party’s denial of Nazism, its ideology and
practices well fit all the criteria of what constitutes a Nazi group. Like other Nazi
organizations, the group sees its ultimate goal as the eradication of the corrupt
social order through the cleansing of the nation’s enemies. The Phoenix-like
rebirth of the Greek nation from its ashes can only be made possible through the
Golden Dawn, a movement from below which embodies the Greek nation and
whose mission is to salvage it from extinction and restore its former glory (Vasilo-
poulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015). Their motto, ‘blood and honour’ is a well-
known Nazi motto; their organization of soup kitchens and blood donations are
FIGURE 11.1 The Golden Dawn logo
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reminiscent of the Nazi ‘Winterhilfswerk’; and their practice of standing and
saluting the leader upon entry is clearly a Nazi practice.
In terms of its online presence, the Golden Dawn has a frequently updated
website (http://www.xryshaygh.com) whose prime aim is to disseminate the
party’s nationalist message and justify its stance on a broad range of issues. The
website is elaborate, with a series of sub-sections including the party’s positions
and manifesto, news and current affairs, history, local government and EP
party activities. There is a special ‘dedications’ page, which offers short articles
on Greek historical events, prominent Greek figures and popular heroes as
well a commemorative texts on anniversary dates for important national
events. Online pages are updated on a regular basis, and it is clear the Golden
Dawn invests time and resources for these activities. News and current affairs
are framed in terms of nationalism, taking advantage of various issues such as
events to do with the country’s relationship with Turkey and FYROM/
Macedonia among others. Interestingly there are many references to Cyprus
and the activities of the Cypriot sister party to the Golden Dawn – ELAM.
The Golden Dawn also has a radio station (radio.antepithesi.gr) and publishes a
number of bulletins, magazines and newspapers that can also be accessed
online, including ethnikismos.net, and https://emprosnews.wordpress.com.
Finally, the party has set up a number of online and on-site stores where one
can purchase a range of paraphernalia including books often authored by
Golden Dawn members, flags, calendars mugs, T-shirts, jewellery and key
rings with the party’s logo (http://www.xakatastima.gr).
Relationship to political groups and public agencies
Overall, other actors have progressively marginalized the Golden Dawn in the Greek
system. Initially, after the party’s election in parliament, its reception was varied with
some political groups actively opposing it and others not taking an active stance. It was
only after the murder of left-wing activist Pavlos Fyssas and the in-depth examination
of the case from the police, that the Golden Dawn started facing a more repressive
environment. This has a visible impact on party activities. For example, the number of
activities the group organized after the 2013 arrest was halved, from 200 activities per
month prior to 2013 to 100 (Ellinas and Lamprianou, 2017a). However, the party has
retained its electoral support, which, considering the increasingly repressive environ-
ment the party operates in, as well as the fact that it hardly campaigned for the 2015
elections because of imprisonment and impending trial, is alarming.
Because of its anti-democratic profile and links to violence, no other political
party in Greece has agreed to co-operate or enter a coalition with the Golden
Dawn. The party does not participate in any European Parliament group. It is
affiliated with the Alliance for Peace and Freedom (APF), which is an alliance of
ultranationalist far right parties and politicians including the German National
Democratic Party (NPD), Italy’s Roberto Fiore, the leader of Italy’s Forza Nuova
(FN), and Nick Griffin, the former leader of the British National Party (BNP).
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With regards to the media, the party is often no-platformed. This, however, was
not always the case. Following the initial success in Athens mayoral elections in
2010, mainstream media began to pay attention to the Golden Dawn as a political
party, frequently covering stories about its members and activities. Much of this
initial media focus was on the Golden Dawn’s charity activities, for example the
blood donations and soup kitchens, while completely ignoring the party’s vigilante
activities and attacks against immigrants and left-wing activists (Prinos, 2014; Kan-
dylis and Kavoulakos , 2011). Often the media even indirectly promoted the
Golden Dawn, portraying its members as modern day Robin Hoods – muscular
skinheads in uniforms whose main goal was to protect the vulnerable members of
the Greek population from the criminal activities that mass immigration brought to
Greece and thus restore law and order (TVXS, 2014). This changed after 2013,
following a series of incidents, which exposed the violent tendencies of Golden
Dawn members, including Ilias Kasidiaris’ attack against KKE MP Liana Kaneli and
SYRIZA MP Rena Dourou live on Greek television (Gilani, 2012).
Last but not least, it is important to discuss the relationship between the Golden
Dawn and the police, which remains a matter of contention in Greece and has
attracted a lot of attention. This issue is sensitive and data is scarce. It is often sug-
gested that the Golden Dawn is particularly appealing to the police. Police officers
tend to be Golden Dawn supporters and constituencies with high numbers of
police voters tend to turn around higher Golden Dawn results. For example, in
their study of police voting behaviour in Athens, Papanicolaou and Papageorgiou
(2016) find that Golden Dawn’s presence has been much more emphatic among
police personnel than among the general public. In addition, according to the
Golden Dawn itself, the number of police officers who voted for the party during
both 2015 elections was approximately 60% (Golden Dawn, 2015). Beyond voting
preferences, the Greek police has frequently been criticized for entrenched racism,
endemic violence and unlawful conduct, sometimes linked with Golden Dawn
activities. In December 2013, among those arrested alongside with Golden Dawn
officials were two police officers; ten police officers were found to have direct or
indirect links with criminal activities attributed to Golden Dawn members
(Amnesty International, 2014). However, systematic data on this issue is absent.
Far-right vigilante activities beyond the Golden Dawn
From 2015 onwards two new extreme-right vigilante groups appeared in Greece,
namely Cryptheia and C18. Both groups appear to be affiliated with the Golden
Dawn (Krithari, 2018) Specifically, Cryptheia is a vigilante group created after a
breakaway from the Golden Dawn (Dettmer, 2017). The group’s purpose is to
force all migrants and refugees out of Greece (Dettmer, 2017). The group became
known after an attack against the residence of an 11-year-old Afghan boy, just
because the boy was selected by his school to carry the Greek flag at a national
parade (Dettmer, 2017). Members of Cryptheia also claimed responsibility for an
arson attack in a refugee centre in Athens’ town centre (Daily Sabah, 2018). With
Vigilantism in Greece: the Golden Dawn 193
regards to the C18, this is another neo-Nazi vigilante group, whose members have
participated in approximately 30 attacks against leftists, anarchists and others (Kri-
thari, 2018). Some have linked this group with the Golden Dawn, as they stress
that C18 replaced Golden Dawn, after the Golden Dawn’s trial started (Krithari,
2018).
The actions of these groups can be subsumed under the concept of vigilantism as
they meet Johnston’s (1996) criteria mentioned earlier in this article, including the
planning, use and frequent threat of violence. Such groups often attempt to take
law enforcement upon themselves (Heitmeyer, 2005). For example, Cryptheia’s
objection to a non-native carrying the Greek flag for whatever reason, led to the
violent attack against the residence of the 11-year-old Afghan boy. In addition,
their attack against the Athens refugee centre is premised on their refusal to accept
the existence of migrants or refugees in Greek territory. Finally, C18’s attacks
against leftists and anarchists are premised on the alleged inability of the legal
system – and law enforcement – to prevent building occupations.
Conclusion
Far-right vigilante groups, operating at the street level, are not uncommon. The
Greek case is particularly interesting, however, as the main vigilante group against
migrants and refugees is also the third biggest party in the Greek parliament. The rise
of the Golden Dawn can be seen as part of a broader trend towards the far right
across Europe. At the same time it is set apart from other European far right parties
precisely because of its vigilante nature and activities: the party openly endorses and
uses violence, which it justifies on the basis of its racist and organic nationalist
ideology. What is striking about the Golden Dawn is the extent to which it con-
tinues to generate electoral support despite the notoriety of its vigilante activities, the
imprisonment of its leading cadres and its impending trial.
Note
1 All the data on trust gathered from the European Commission, as it is yearly and also
comparable to the other European Union countries.
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Trust in institutions: Prior to the crisis (in 2007), trust in political parties was 20.5%
(European Commission, 2018).1 In 2011, this number dropped to 5.1% and in 2013,
it declined further to 4.1%. Similar dynamics apply for levels of trust in government
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and parliament. In 2007, trust in government was 45.5%. However, in 2011 this was
reduced to 8.5%. Trust in the national parliament declined from 51.85% in 2007 to
12% and 11.89% in 2011 and 2013 respectively. Dissatisfaction with democracy also
confirms the above argument. In 2007, 62.8% of Greek citizens were satisfied with
democracy in their country. However, in 2011 only 17% were very or fairly satisfied
with democracy; in 2013 this number slightly increased to 18% (European Commis-
sion, 2018).
Trust in army and the police: In 2010 trust in the army in 2010 (2011 is not available) was
66.73% and trust in the police was 52% (European Commission, 2018). In 2014 (2013 is
not available either) both figures had increased to 71.53% and 58.93% respectively.
Immigration: With regards to actual immigration figures, the stock of foreign-born population
in Greece is low compared to other European countries. It declined from 7.4% (or 828.4
thousands) in 2010 to 6.6 (or 727.5 thousand) in 2014 (OECD, 2018a). The number of
inflows of foreign population also declined in recent years. In 2005 the number of inflows
of foreign population in Greece was 65.3 thousand; in 2009 this number dropped to 35.8
thousand; and in 2011, a year before the national elections that saw the entry of the
Golden Dawn in the Greek parliament for the first time, the number further decreased to
33 thousand (OECD, 2018b).
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